

Name: _____ USC ID: _____ Date: _____

Signature: _____. Discussion Section: _____

(By signing here, I certify that I have taken this test while refraining from cheating.)

Exam 1

This exam contains 8 pages (including this cover page) and 5 problems. Enter all requested information on the top of this page.

You may *not* use your books, notes, or any calculator on this exam.

You are required to show your work on each problem on this exam. The following rules apply:

- You have 50 minutes to complete the exam, starting at the beginning of class.
- **Organize your work**, in a reasonably neat and coherent way, in the space provided. Work scattered all over the page without a clear ordering will receive very little credit.
- **Mysterious or unsupported answers will not receive full credit.** A correct answer, unsupported by calculations, explanation, or algebraic work will receive no credit; an incorrect answer supported by substantially correct calculations and explanations might still receive partial credit.
- If you need more space, use the back of the pages; clearly indicate when you have done this. Scratch paper appears at the end of the document.

Problem	Points	Score
1	8	
2	10	
3	10	
4	10	
5	10	
Total:	48	

Do not write in the table to the right. Good luck!^a

^aFebruary 18, 2026, © 2026 Steven Heilman, All Rights Reserved.

Reference sheet

Below are some definitions that may be relevant.

An **impartial combinatorial game** is a combinatorial game with two players who both have the same set of legal moves. A **terminal position** is a position from which there are no legal moves. Every non-terminal position has at least one legal move. Under **normal play**, the player who moves to the terminal position wins.

For any impartial combinatorial game, let \mathbf{N} (for “next”) be the set of game positions such that the first player to move can guarantee a win. Let \mathbf{P} denote the set of game positions such that *any* legal move leads to a position in \mathbf{N} . We also let \mathbf{P} contain all terminal positions.

Let m be a positive integer.

$$\Delta_m := \{x = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{R}^m : \sum_{i=1}^m x_i = 1, x_i \geq 0, \forall 1 \leq i \leq m\}.$$

Let m, n be positive integers. Let A be an $m \times n$ real matrix. Then the **value** of the two-person zero-sum game with payoff matrix A is

$$\max_{x \in \Delta_m} \min_{y \in \Delta_n} x^T A y.$$

A mixed strategy $\tilde{x} \in \Delta_m$ is **optimal for player I** if

$$\min_{y \in \Delta_n} \tilde{x}^T A y = \max_{x \in \Delta_m} \min_{y \in \Delta_n} x^T A y.$$

A mixed strategy $\tilde{y} \in \Delta_n$ is **optimal for player II** if

$$\max_{x \in \Delta_m} x^T A \tilde{y} = \min_{y \in \Delta_n} \max_{x \in \Delta_m} x^T A y.$$

We say the pair (\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) are **optimal strategies** for the payoff matrix A if $\tilde{x} \in \Delta_m$ is optimal for player I and $\tilde{y} \in \Delta_n$ is optimal for player II.

For any $x = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{R}^m$, we denote

$$\|x\| := \left(\sum_{i=1}^m x_i^2 \right)^{1/2}.$$

1. Label the following statements as TRUE or FALSE. If the statement is true, **explain your reasoning**. If the statement is false, **provide a counterexample and explain your reasoning**.

(a) (2 points) In the game of chess, it is known that the first player has a winning strategy. That is, the first player can guarantee a win, regardless of what the second player does.

TRUE FALSE (circle one)

(b) (2 points) Suppose the game of Nim begins with one pile of 9999 chips and one pile of 10000 chips. Then the first player has a winning strategy.

TRUE FALSE (circle one)

(c) (2 points) Let A be a real 10×10 matrix. Then

$$\max_{x \in \Delta_{10}} \min_{y \in \Delta_{10}} x^T A y = \min_{y \in \Delta_{10}} \max_{x \in \Delta_{10}} x^T A y.$$

TRUE FALSE (circle one)

(d) (2 points) Every two-player zero-sum game has an optimal strategy.

TRUE FALSE (circle one)

-
2. (10 points) Prove the following. On a standard Hex game board, the first player has a winning strategy. That is, the first player has a strategy that guarantees a win, regardless of what the second player does.

[This was from the notes/class]

3. (10 points) Let $K := \{(x_1, x_2, x_3) \in \mathbf{R}^3 : (x_1 - 4)^2 + (x_2 - 4)^2 + (x_3 - 4)^2 \leq 1\}$.

- Show that $(0, 0, 0) \notin K$.
- Prove that there exists some $z \in \mathbf{R}^3$ and $c > 0$ such that

$$z^T x > c, \quad \forall x \in K.$$

(You may assume that K is closed and convex without proof, i.e. you do not have to prove that K is closed and convex.)

- Write down an explicit form of z such that

$$z^T x > 1, \quad \forall x \in K.$$

Justify your answer. (For example, maybe $z = (-5, 3, 1)$ works.)

[This was a modification of class material.]

4. (10 points) Let $n \geq 2$ be an integer. Prove that Δ_n is convex and bounded.

(Recall a set $K \subseteq \mathbf{R}^n$ is convex if, for any $x, y \in K$ and for any $t \in [0, 1]$, we have $tx + (1 - t)y \in K$.)

(Recall a set $K \subseteq \mathbf{R}^n$ is bounded if there exists $r > 0$ such that $\|x\| \leq r$ for all $x \in K$.)

[This was a homework/practice exam question]

5. (10 points) Find the value of the two-person zero-sum game described by the payoff matrix

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 4 & 7 & 1 \\ 2 & 5 & 9 & 10 \\ 3 & 6 & 9 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Describe optimal strategies for this game.

[This was a modified homework question.]

(Scratch paper)